Pre-amble
The following are some snippets from my writings over the
period mid-1996 to early-1998. Obviously, I would not claim
to have got everything right - indeed a file of wrong calls
would be equally easy to fill. No commentator or administrator
can claim perfect foresight (although many seem to be blessed
with twenty-twenty hindsight!). Indeed as Hayek has argued,
such a belief was the erroneous basis for the failed socialist
experiments of this century and is thus 'the fatal conceit'.
However, I would like to think that I am one of those commentators
who has been right (or wrong) more often than not for at
least this affords one the ability to consistently trade
on (or against) the views on offer. After all, the economist
with a fifty-fifty record - normally the result of slavishly
hugging consensus - is about as much use as an ejector seat
on a helicopter.
.
So how callable was the Asian crisis? Well, many of Asia's
problems - falling profitability, eroding competitiveness,
over-investment, external debt currency mismatches, and
excessive lending to property and share markets - were apparent
back in 1996 (and even earlier) and therefore contrary to
popular perception, I believe many of the region's troubles
were predictable. Moreover, many of these problems were
common to a range of countries with close linkages so the
contagion jumping from one to another should not have come
as such a surprise.
.
What was impossible to forecast as a base case back in the
early days of the crisis was the extent to which poor policy
responses - both IMF-dictated and far more crucially at
a domestic level - and a shared sense of denial, would contribute
to the complete collapse of confidence that pervaded the
region by late 1997. Nevertheless, this extreme chain of
events was always a possibility, albeit one with a low probability
at the outset. This should not have precluded scenario planning
though and indeed as the crisis progressed, so the probabilities
rose.
.
One final observation. As an employee of an investment bank
with a range of corporate and government relationships around
the region, I was somewhat constrained in what I could say
in print. My verbal comments tended to be less censored
but you will just have to take my word for it! Or alternatively,
see some of the kind comments made by clients about my work.
And I didn't even have to pay for some of them......
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